Tait Connection

Let’s start by looking at the nature of the threat. For example:

2015 UKRAINE

A cyber attack on December 23 caused a power outage in western Ukraine impacting 225,000 utilities customers. The attackers remotely tripped breakers after installing malware, thereby bringing down the power grid. They also clogged the utility’s service center with spam calls to block genuine calls from affected customers.

2013 NEW YORK

Iranian hackers infiltrated the operations center of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small flood control dam in New York, by means of a broadband cellular modem that connected the dam to the Internet. While the dam controls were not accessed, the facility was apparently targeted by a wider network scan for industrial control systems exposed to the Internet.

2010 IRAN

The Stuxnet computer worm penetrated an ICS at the Natanz Iranian nuclear facility via a portable USB drive. It infected the Siemens Simatic S7 programmable logic controllers that managed the centrifuges used for fuel enrichment, speeding them up until they self-destructed.

2005 UNITED STATES

A report for the Idaho National Laboratory (a US Department of Energy National Laboratory) detailed 120 cyber security attacks on US control systems1.

An incident report recently issued by a US government agency tasked with tracking ICS security threats in the US noted the trend from 2010-2015.

Nu mb er o frep or t edi nc id en t s

2010

2011 140

2012 197

2013 257

2014 245

2015 295

In the US and elsewhere, it is likely that many cyber attacks go unreported, which would make the upward trend in security incidents significantly steeper.

WHAT IS AN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM?

An industrial control system monitors and controls a set of industrial equipment. You might find an ICS controlling an electricity distribution network, a field of oil rigs, refinery processing equipment, or a factory assembly line. Data (meter readings, status reports) are sent from a remote or local site to a control center where – by human or automatic intervention - commands can be sent back to change the operation of the physical equipment. As well as being remotely monitored and controlled, operation can be modified, turned on, or off.